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What should the Bayesian do




Bayesians have a well-developed account of how you should change
your credences when you learn new evidence; that is, when your
body of evidence grows. What’s more, they have a range of epistemic
and pragmatic arguments that support that account. But they do not
have a satisfactory account of when and how you should change your
credences when you become aware of new possibilities; that is, when
your awareness grows. In this paper, I consider each of the argu-
ments for the Bayesian’s account of how respond to evidence, and I
ask whether they can generate a Bayesian account of how to respond
to awareness growth. I argue that, with one exception, they can’t.
I conclude that our credal response to awareness growth is consid-
erably less rigorously constrained than our credal response to new
evidence.
The epistemology of credences—or Bayesian epistemology, as it is of-
ten known—is concerned with two sorts of norms, synchronic ones and
diachronic ones. Synchronic norms govern the credences you have at a
given time. Putative examples include: Probabilism, which says that your
credences at any time should obey the axioms of the probability calcu-
lus; the Principal Principle, which says that your credence in a proposition
conditional on its objective chance being a certain probability should just
be that probability (Lewis, 1980); and the Principle of Maximum Entropy,
which says that, at any time, your credences should have maximal Shan-
non entropy among all credences that respect your total evidence at that
time, where Shannon entropy is a mathematical function taken to measure
how unopinionated your credences are (Williamson, 2010). On the other
hand, diachronic norms govern the relationships between the credences
you have at different times. Putative examples include: Bayesian Condi-
tionalization, which says, if between an earlier and a later time you learn
a proposition with certainty and nothing more, then your credences at the
later time should be your credences at the earlier time conditional on that
proposition; Richard Jeffrey’s Probability Kinematics, which tells you how
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to respond if your evidence does not come in the form of a proposition
learned with certainty, but instead determines the posterior credences you
should assign to the propositions in a given partition (Jeffrey, 1965, Chap-
ter 11); and Adam’s Conditionalization, which tells you how to respond if
your evidence determines not your posterior credences in the elements of
a given partition, but your posterior credence in some proposition condi-
tional on another (Wagner, 2003; Bradley, 2005).
Now notice that all of the diachronic norms I just listed tell you how
to respond when you receive evidence that comes in different forms. And
indeed that is a representative sample of the norms discussed in the litera-
ture. But obtaining new evidence is not the only thing that can happen to
you that might prompt or justify or demand a change in your credences.
You might learn nothing new about the world, but instead acquire a new
concept, draw a new distinction, or become aware of a new entity or possi-
bility. For instance, previously, you might have categorised people’s polit-
ical views using the categories very liberal, liberal, centrist, conservative, very
conservative, but now you learn the concept of a leftist, and you realise such
people do not fall under any of your current categories. Or you might have
categorised everyone as on the left-right economic axis and then learned of
the libertarian-authoritarian social axis. When one of these things happens
to you, you often come to assign credences to propositions you have not
considered before: propositions that employ the new concept; propositions
that depend on the new distinction or the new possibility or ascribe proper-
ties to the newly-discovered entity. Having learned of leftists, I will be able
to assign a credence to the proposition that my friend Jan is a leftist; having
learned of the social axis of political orientation, I might assign credence to
the proposition that Jan is a left-libertarian. It is these sorts of case that I
wish to consider in this paper. In the relatively small literature that treats
them, they tend to be called cases of awareness growth.1 Note that none of
the diachronic norms I listed in the previous paragraph apply to such cases.
Typically, cases of awareness growth divide into two groups: refinement
cases and expansion cases. In a refinement case, the experience leads me to
refine a possibility I previously considered. This is what happens, for in-
stance, when I am only aware of the economic axis of political orientation
and then become aware of the social axis as well. To present it crudely, I
might previously have considered only the two possibilities, Jan is on the
left and Jan is on the right. Learning of the social axis, I now split the first
of these possibilities into two and consider Jan is left-libertarian and Jan is
left-conservative; and I split the second in the same way and consider Jan
is right-libertarian and Jan is right-conservative. In an expansion case, on the
1For a state-of-the-art philosophical treatment of these cases, see (Steele & Stefánsson,
2021). For other treatments, see (Karni & Vierø, 2013; Bradley, 2017; Roussos, 2020; Mahtani,
ta; Canson, ms).
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other hand, I learn of a new possibility that is not a refinement of any pos-
sibility I have considered before. This happens when I learn of the political
left, having been aware only of liberalism and conservativism before that.
Again presenting it crudely, I previously considered only Jan is liberal, Jan is
a centrist, and Jan is conservative, but now I add a fourth possibility, namely,
Jan is a leftist. The question is then: what norms, if any, govern the relation-
ship between the credences I assign before my awareness grows—either by
refinement or expansion—and the credences I assign afterwards?
1 Terminology
Before we begin, it will be helpful to introduce a little terminology. We rep-
resent your credal state at a given time by your credence function. This is
a mathematical function c that takes each proposition X to which you as-
sign a credence at that time and returns the credence c(X) that you assign.
We call the set F containing all of the propositions to which you assign a
credence your agenda. And we represent your credences on a scale from 0,
which is minimal credence or 0%, to 1, which is maximal credence or 100%.
So, if your agenda at a given time is the set of propositions F , if X is in
F , and if c is your credence function, then c(X) is at least 0 and at most
1. Knowing different readers favour different levels of formalisation, I will
throughout try not to give any mathematical or symbolic presentation of a
point without first giving it informally.
2 Impermissivism and awareness growth
Before we get started, it’s worth noting that there are certain Bayesians for
whom the problem barely arises. First, let’s consider Objective Bayesianism.2
According to proponents of this position, there are really just three funda-
mental norms that govern your credences, and they are all synchronic. Any
diachronic norms are merely consequences of these. The three synchronic
norms of objective Bayesianism are those we listed above: Probabilism, the
Principal Principle, and the Principle of Maximum Entropy. The idea is
this: your total evidence at a time imposes constraints on the credences at
that time. The credence function you should have is the one that maximises
Shannon entropy among all those credence functions that obey Probabilism
and the Principal Principle and which satisfy these evidential constraints.
Recall: Shannon entropy is a mathematical measure of how unopinionated
a credence function is.
2The version I present here is due to Jon Williamson (2010). Other versions include
(Jaynes, 2003) and (Paris & Vencovská, 1990).
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So, for instance, you might start your epistemic life assigning credences
to just three possibilities, which you take to be exclusive and exhaustive. At
this point, you have no evidence and so it imposes no constraints on your
credences. Therefore, applying the Principle of Maximum Entropy, you as-
sign credence 13 to each possibility, since that’s what maximises Shannon
entropy. Then you learn with certainty the proposition that is true only at
the first two possibilities. This places on your posterior credence function
the constraint that it assign maximal credence 1 to that proposition. Ap-
plying the Principle of Maximum Entropy at this later time, but this time
including this new constraint imposed on your credences by your evidence,
you adopt a posterior that assigns credence 12 to the first two possibilities
and credence 0 to the third, since that’s what maximises Shannon entropy
among the credence functions that satisfy Probabilism, the Principal Prin-
ciple, and the new constraint.
Now, suppose that, instead of learning that proposition with certainty,
you don’t acquire any evidence about the world at all, but instead you be-
come aware of a distinction that divides the first possibility into two more
fine-grained possibilities, but leaves the second and third possibilities un-
touched. Then, applying the Principle of Maximum Entropy, you adopt
a posterior that divides credence equally across the four possibilities of
which you are now aware: the two fine-grained versions of the original
first possibility, and then the original second and third possibility. So it as-
signs credence 14 to each:
1
4 to each of the fine-grained versions of the first
original possibility, and therefore 12 to the first original possibility itself; and
1
4 to each of the original second and third possibilities.
For the objective Bayesian, there are no fundamentally diachronic norms,
and so none that govern cases of awareness growth. The fundamental
norms—Probabilism, the Principal Principle, and the Principle of Maxi-
mum Entropy—are synchronic, and they are sufficient on their own to de-
termine the unique rational response to your epistemic situation at every
time in your epistemic life. These synchronic norms might entail diachronic
norms, but the latter are epiphenomal.
A second sort of Bayesian for whom the problem barely arises is one
who thinks there is really just one credal norm, and again it is synchronic.
We might call the norm Evidential Probabilism and the position that en-
dorses it Evidential Bayesianism. Evidential Probabilism posits an evidential
probability function, which takes any body of evidence and any proposi-
tion and returns the so-called evidential probability of that proposition rel-
ative to that evidence, which is taken to measure how likely that evidence
makes that proposition, or how strongly that evidence supports or con-
firms that proposition (Williamson, 2000). Again, for this sort of Bayesian,
any diachronic norms are epiphenomal—they follow from this single syn-
chronic norm, which determines what credences someone should assign at
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a given time without reference to their credences at any other time.
In general, the problem of awareness growth hardly arises for those
who are impermissivists about rational credence. An impermissivist says
that, for any individual, at any time, and for any proposition to which they
assign a credence at that time, there is exactly one credence that rationality
requires them to assign to that proposition at that time, and this unique cre-
dence does not depend on the individual’s previous credences. For more
austere impermissivists, this unique credence is determined only by the
individual’s evidence at that time. The Evidential Probabilist is such an
impermissivist. For less austere impermissivists, it is determined partly
by the evidence and partly by the set of possibilities the individual con-
siders. The Objective Bayesian is such an impermissivist. Neither sort of
impermissivist need give diachronic norms governing awareness growth.
Rather, according to them, at each time in your epistemic life, you need not
consider what credences you had at any earlier time in order to set your
credences now; you need only consider the evidence you have now, and
perhaps the set of possibilities you consider; these alone determine the ra-
tional credences you should assign to the propositions in your agenda.
3 Reverse Bayesianism and its discontents
Let’s suppose, then, that we are not impermissivists about credal rationality—
we are, instead, permissivists. What diachronic norms might we then im-
pose on our credal response to awareness growth?
One popular such norm is Reverse Bayesian, which says that, while you
are not required to retain your credences in the old propositions when you
come to assign credences in the new ones, you should at least retain the
ratios between any two of the old propositions (Karni & Vierø, 2013).3 In
symbols:
Reverse Bayesianism (RB) Suppose c defined on F is your cre-
dence function at the earlier time t, and c′ defined on F ′ is your
credence function at the later time t′, andF ⊆ F ′. And suppose
that, between t and t′ the only epistemically relevant thing that
happens to you is that you become aware of the propositions in






Anna Mahtani (ta) has a neat counterexample to RB. You are staying
3Richard Bradley (2017) proposes a closely related principle, which he calls Rigid Exten-
sion. The counterexamples to Reverse Bayesianism that we will consider below are equally
counterexamples to that.
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with a friend, Bob, and while alone in the kitchen you hear someone singing
in the shower. You assign credence to four propositions:
• Landlord, which says it’s the landlord of the flat who is singing,
• Tenant, which says it’s a tenant of the flat,
• Bob, which says that Bob is the singer, and
• Bob → Tenant, which says if Bob is the singer, then the singer is a
tenant.
You assign credence 12 to Landlord and
1
2 to Tenant. Knowing Bob is a tenant,
you assign credence 1 to Bob→ Tenant. And you assign 12 to Bob. But now it
occurs to you that there might be another tenant. You thus become aware of
two further propositions to which you will now need to assign credences:
• Other, which says that it is someone other than Bob or the Landlord
singing; and
• Other→ Tenant, which says that the other singer is a tenant.
You’re certain that there is only one landlord, so you assign credence 1
to Other → Tenant. What do you assign to Other? According to Reverse
Bayesianism, whatever credences you assign to Landlord, Tenant, Bob, Bob
→ Tenant, Other, and Other → Tenant (that is, the propositions in F ′), the
ratios between your credences in Landlord, Tenant, Bob, and Bob → Tenant
(that is, the propositions inF ) should be the same as before. But that entails
that your new credence in Bob must equal your new credence in Tenant,
since that was the case with your old credences. And thus, if your new
credences are to be coherent and your credence in Other→ Tenant is 1, your
new credence in Other must be 0. And that doesn’t seem right.
There are many examples with the same structure. In each, the situation
is akin to the case we described in our presentation of Objective Bayesian-
ism’s treatment of awareness growth above: that is, the awareness growth
leads the individual to divide certain possibilities they had previously con-
sidered into more fine-grained possibilities, but they do not divide each of
the original possibilities equally. In Mahtani’s case, your realisation that
there might be another tenant leads you to divide the possibility Tenant in
two, but it leaves the possibility Landlord untouched. Something similar
will happen if you come to realise a logical possibility you hadn’t consid-
ered before. For instance, you might have originally categorised people’s
religious beliefs by labelling them theist, agnostic, or atheist. But it might
never have occurred to you that anyone might believe in more than one
god, so you assign the same credence to monotheist and theist (and you’re
certain of monotheist → theist). When you do realise this alternative pos-
sibililty, you might divide the possibility theist into the more fine-grained
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possibilities monotheist and polytheist, just as you divided Tenant into Bob
and Other above.
And something similar will also happen if you enrich your conceptual
space in a way that divides some possibilities but not others. For instance,
a person who grew up red-green colour blind in a community of red-green
colour blind people might only have the colour concepts yellow, blue, and
green. So, when they think of some object they haven’t seen, and wish to
assign credences to its possible different colours, they might assign 13 to It is
yellow, It is blue, and It is green. After all, even if we don’t think, with the Ob-
jective Bayesians that it is rationally required to choose the credences with
maximum Shannon entropy, we might nonetheless think is it rationally per-
mitted. But the person might then be told that, among those objects they
see as green, there are in fact two colours, green and red; and among those
objects they see as yellow, there are in fact two colours, orange and yel-
low. Or indeed, at some future stage of ocular medicine, they might have
their colour blindness surgically corrected. This might lead them to acquire
new concepts: they might divide yellow into orange-yellow and yellow-yellow,
and green into red-green and green-green, but leave blue untouched. And
they might then again follow the Objective Bayesian, as they are permit-
ted though not mandated to do, and divide their credences equally over
the five new possibilities, namely, It is orange-yellow, It is yellow-yellow, and
so on. But, if they do that, their new credence for yellow will be the sum
of their new credences for yellow-yellow and orange-yellow, and that is twice
their new credence for blue, whereas their old credence in yellow is the same
as their old credence in blue. So they will violate Reverse Bayesianism de-
spite doing something that seems rationally beyond reproach.
For these reasons, I think Reverse Bayesianism must be wrong.
4 Looking to the arguments
When we seek to extend an existing norm to cover a broader range of cases
than it currently governs, there are a number of ways to proceed. We might
simply consult our intuitions about the new cases and try to think of a gen-
eral norm that captures all of those intuitions; we might think about the
intuitive, informal motivation for the original norm and ask what that mo-
tivates in the new cases; or we might think about the more formal, philo-
sophical arguments for the original norm and ask what happens when you
apply them to these new cases. In this paper, I’d like to do the latter in
an attempt to extend the standard Bayesian norms for diachronic credal
norms so that they cover cases in which you respond not to new substan-
tial evidence about the world, but to awareness growth. I’ll consider two
sorts of arguments for the standard norm of Bayesian Conditionalization,
which says that, if between an earlier and a later time, the only epistemi-
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cally relevant thing that happens to you is that you learn a proposition with
certainty, and if your prior credence function at the earlier time gave posi-
tive credence to that proposition, then your posterior credence at the later
time should be obtained from your prior by conditioning on the proposi-
tion; that is, your posterior credences should be your prior credences con-
ditional on the evidence you’ve acquired. In symbols:
Bayesianism Conditionalization (BC) Suppose:
(i) c is your credence function at the earlier time t, and c is
defined on F ;
(ii) c′ is your credence function at the later time t′, and c′ is
defined on F ;
(iii) between t and t′, the only epistemically relevant thing that
happens to you is that you learn proposition E with cer-
tainty.
Then, if c(E) > 0, then it should be that, for all X in F ,
c′(X) = c(X|E) =df.
c(XE)
c(E)
The first sort of argument I’ll consider argues not directly for updating by
conditioning on your evidence, but for planning to update by condition-
ing on your evidence. I’ll consider both pragmatic and epistemic versions
of these arguments (Section 5). The second sort of argument does argue
directly for updating by conditioning. Again, I’ll consider both pragmatic
and epistemic versions (Section 6).
5 Arguments for planning to condition on your evi-
dence
5.1 Pragmatic arguments for planning
Let’s begin with the pragmatic arguments for Bayesian Conditionalization.
The first is due to Peter M. Brown (1976). As is often pointed out, Brown’s
argument is not in fact an argument for updating by Bayesian conditioning;
rather, it is an argument for planning to update in this way. It goes like this.
You must first assume that there is some set of propositions from which the
evidence you acquire between an earlier time and a later time will come;
and you must assume that this set forms a partition. An updating plan is
then a function that takes a proposition in this set and returns the posterior
credence function the plan asks you to adopt should you learn that propo-
sition with certainty. We say that an updating plan is a conditionalizing plan
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for your prior if, for each element of the partition to which your prior assigns
positive credence, the plan tells you to respond to learning it by condition-
ing your prior on it. We then imagine that, at the later time, after you’ve
updated your credences in response to the evidence you acquire, you will
face a decision between a number of options; and we assume that you will
choose between the options by maximising expected utility from the point
of view of your credences at that time. We then say that the pragmatic
utility of an updating plan at a possible world is the pragmatic utility of
the posterior credence function it recommends in response to the evidence
you’ll receive at that world; and the pragmatic utility of a posterior is the
utility of the option that maximises expected utility from its point of view.
Brown then shows that:
(i) for any updating plan that is a conditionalizing plan for your prior
and any decision problem you might face, the updating plan max-
imises pragmatic expected utility from the point of view of your prior;
and
(ii) for any updating plan that isn’t a conditionalizing plan for your prior,
there is some decision problem you might face for which this plan
does not maximise the expected utility from the point of view of your
prior.
The second pragmatic argument for Bayesian Conditionalization is due
to David Lewis (1999). Again, it’s an argument for planning to update
by conditioning, not an argument for simply updating in that way. This
time, the argument does not assume you know the partition from which
your future evidence will come. Rather, it takes any proposition to which
you currently assign a positive credence and asks how you plan to update
should you learn this proposition with certainty. And it shows two things:
(i) if you plan to update in some way other than by conditioning, then
there is a set of bets your prior credences will lead you to accept and,
whether or not you learn that proposition, there will be a further set
of bets that your posterior credences will lead you to accept such that,
taken together, the earlier and later sets of bets will lose you money
for sure; and
(ii) if you plan to update by conditioning on the evidence, there can be no
such sets of bets.
Can these arguments be adapted to establish any norms that cover the
cases of awareness growth we are considering? One problem is that it isn’t
clear how to formulate the notion of an updating plan in such a case. In
Brown’s argument, plans are functions defined on partitions that contain
the possible pieces of evidence the individual might receive between the
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earlier and later times. What should replace the partition in the case of
awareness growth? You might naturally think that we should replace that
component with the set of possible future agendas to whose members the
individual might come to assign credences at the later time. So suppose
you now consider the agenda that includes only Landlord, Bob, Tenant, and
Bob → Tenant. But at a later point you will expand that either by consid-
ering the possibility there is one other tenant and thus adding Other and
Other → Tenant or by considering that there are another two tenants and
thus adding Other and Yet Another, and Other→ Tenant and Yet Another→
Tenant. And now suppose we ask how you should plan to respond to these
different possible ways in which your awareness might grow. The prob-
lem is this: when you consider all of the extra possibilities in these new
agendas in order to formulate your updating plans, you already expand
your awareness to include them. So you are unable to make these plans
without expanding you awareness and setting new credences in the new
agendas anyway; you are unable to make these plans without solving the
very problem the plans were designed to address. The point is that the
different possible ways in which your awareness might expand are very
different from the ways in which your evidence might expand. In the latter
case, there are some possibilities considered at the earlier time that sim-
ply aren’t actual and of which you shouldn’t become certain—reflecting on
possible future evidence shouldn’t make you certain of that evidence now.
But in the former case, in contrast, by considering the extra possibilities at
the earlier time, you immediately expand your agenda to include them.
And the same point applies to Lewis’ argument. In that case, our plan
isn’t defined for all of the different ways we might expand our agenda.
Rather, for each one, we make a bespoke plan. But the point still applies.
When we make that plan, we become aware of the possibilities of which
we might become aware between now and the later time. But we thereby
become aware of them now, and so we have to solve the problem of updat-
ing in the face of this awareness growth before we can even make the plan
for how to do so.
Now, you might complain that I have been too literal in my understand-
ing of updating plans. I have conceived of them as mental items that the
individual considers consciously at the earlier time. But perhaps we might
better, or at least alternatively, conceive of them as dispositions.4 That is,
an updating plan says how we are disposed to update our credences when
4See Mahtani (ta) for a related appeal to dispositions in the context of awareness growth.
In Mahtani’s terminology, I am using credence functions to model the credences the in-
dividual assigns to propositions of which they’re consciously aware; and I’m now con-
sidering the dispositions we have to adopt different credence functions upon awareness
growth. Mahtani tends to speak instead of dispositions to have different credences in the
same propositions in different circumstances. But I think the resulting pictures are very
close.
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our awareness grows in different ways. If we think of them like that, the
argument given in the previous few paragraphs does not apply. I can be
disposed to respond to becoming aware of new propositions in a particular
way without already being aware of them. And so we might still hope to
run Brown’s and Lewis’ arguments so that they govern the rationality of
having certain updating dispositions.
In fact, conceiving of plans as recording dispositions does not help re-
vive Brown’s argument. After all, in that argument, you assess the prag-
matic utility of an updating plan from the point of view of your prior cre-
dences. But that requires that your prior credences assign probabilities to
the possible stimuli for your updating—new evidence in Brown’s case; in
our case, new concepts, distinctions, or hitherto unconsidered logical possi-
bilities, any one of which results in our agenda expanding. But of course it’s
exactly by having credences in the possible ways in which your awareness
might grow that results in awareness growth itself in the way described in
the previous few paragraphs. So that’s not going to work.
How about Lewis’ argument? Here, things seem more hopeful. Af-
ter all, just as there is a sure loss betting argument for planning to update
by Bayesian conditioning, so there is a sure loss betting argument for a
norm that I will call the Weak Reflection Principle (van Fraassen, 1999;
Pettigrew, ta). It says: your current credence function should be a mix-
ture (or weighted sum or convex combination) of your possible future cre-
dence functions, once those possible future credence functions have been
restricted to the agenda on which your prior is defined. In symbols:
Weak Reflection Principle (WRP) Suppose
(i) c is your credence function at t, and c is defined on F ;
(ii) c′1, . . . , c
′
n are the possible credence functions you might
have at t′, and c′i is defined on F ′i , where F ⊆ F ′i ;
(iii) ci is the restriction of c′i to F .
Then it should be that c is a mxiture of c1, . . . , cn. That is, there
should be non-negative real numbers λ1, . . . , λn that sum to 1
such that, for all propositions X in your original agenda F ,
c(X) = λ1c1(X) + . . . + λncn(X)
As I note (Pettigrew, ta):
(i) if you violate WRP, there is a set of bets that your priors will lead you
to accept at the earlier time and a set of bets that any of the possible
posteriors will lead you to accept at the later time such that, taken
together, these will lose you money however the world turns out; and
(ii) if you satisfy WRP, there can be no such sets of bets.
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So it might seem that this result places normative constraints on how
you should be disposed to respond to awareness growth. However you
are disposed to respond to each of the possible expansions of your agenda,
it had better be that your prior is a mixture of the possible posteriors your
dispositions might bequeath to you. Nonetheless, I’m a little sceptical. One
problem is that it is a little externalist for my taste. That is, you might fall
foul of WRP because of some feature of the world of which you are unaware
and of which you could not hope to have been aware at the time.
To see this, we look first to the application of WRP in the standard case
in which your posterior is a response not to awareness growth but to new
evidence. Suppose that, between an earlier and a later time you will learn
exactly one of the propositions from a set with certainty. If that set forms a
partition, and if, for each proposition in it, the posterior credence function
you are disposed to adopt in response to learning that proposition is certain
of it, then WRP entails that each possible posterior is obtained from your
prior by conditioning on the evidence that prompts it. That is, under this
condition on your possible future evidence, WRP entails that you should
plan to update by conditioning your prior on that evidence. But now sup-
pose that the set of propositions you might learn between the earlier and
later time does not form a partition. Then it does not follow from WRP that
you should update by conditioning on your evidence. Indeed, for some
such sets of possible future evidence, WRP entails that you should not up-
date in this way! Here’s an example: A friend has bought a new brooch,
but I don’t know what colour it is. I consider three possibilities, Red, Yel-
low, Blue, and I assign credence 13 to each. Now suppose that, between now
and some future time, I will learn something about its colour from another
friend who has seen it. But, unbeknownst to me, because that other friend
has a particular sort of colourblindedness, they will either tell me Red ∨
Yellow or Red ∨ Blue. They will not be able to rule out Red, and so they will
not tell me Yellow ∨ Blue. And now suppose that I am disposed to react to
these two possible pieces of evidence by conditioning on whichever I re-
ceive. Then, whichever I receive, my posterior credence in Red will become
1
2 . And since my prior was
1
3 , my prior cannot be a mixture of my possible
future posteriors. So by being disposed to update by conditioning, I violate
WRP and become vulnerable to a sure loss. And the reason is an external
constraint on the evidence I might acquire between the earlier and later
time. Something about the world of which I’m not aware makes it possible
that I will learn the brooch is red or yellow, and possible that I will learn
it’s red or blue, but not possible that I will learn it’s yellow or blue. And
because of that, being disposed to update by conditioning on my evidence
becomes irrational.
Of course, you might wonder why this is a problem for externalism
rather than a problem for BC or for sure loss arguments in general. After all,
surely the problem doesn’t go away if we imagine that I know, at the earlier
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time, that the only possible evidence I might receive is Red ∨ Blue and Red
∨ Yellow. Knowing only that doesn’t rule out any of the possibilities, nor
indeed tell in favour of any of them over the others. So surely it’s still
permissible to assign credence 13 to each? That’s true, but now what you
learn by the later time is no longer just Red ∨ Blue and Red ∨ Yellow, but
also the fact that you learned it. So we now have four possibilities instead
of three:
• The brooch is red, and I learn it’s either red or blue
• The brooch is red, and I learn it’s either red or yellow
• The brooch is blue, and I learn it’s either red or blue
• The brooch is yellow, and I learn it’s either red or yellow
So, if I assign credence 13 to each of the original three possibilities, I must
divide my credence of 13 that the brooch is red between the two new, more
fine-grained possibilities that make that up. Let’s say I split it evenly. Then,




3 to Blue, and 0 to Yellow. And if I learn Red ∨ Yellow and thereby
learn that I learn it, my posterior assigns 13 to Red,
2
3 to Yellow, and 0 to Blue.
And this time my prior is a mixture of the two possible future posteriors.
Thus, I satisfy WRP and I am not vulnerable to a sure loss.
The same problem haunts us when we apply WRP to the case of aware-
ness growth. Indeed, there are examples very similar in spirit. Suppose
that, rather than learning Red ∨ Blue or Red ∨ Yellow between the earlier
and later time, I instead will expand my awareness in one of two ways.
I will either become aware of a distinction between two different sorts of
reds and two different sorts of yellow, or between two different sorts of red
and two different sorts of blue. In each case, I am disposed to respond by
dividing credences equally across the five new possibilities—the four new
fine-grained possibilities and the one original possibility, which my aware-
ness growth has not further divided. Then, whichever of the two ways my
awareness might grow, my posterior will assign credence 25 to Red. But my
prior assigns credence 13 . So it is not a mixture of my possible posteriors. I
thereby violate WRP and I am vulnerable to a sure loss.
That wraps up all I have to say about the pragmatic arguments for plan-
ning to condition on your evidence and their implications for responding
to awareness growth. What of the epistemic arguments? In the end, these
are formally so similar to the pragmatic ones that the same considerations
apply.
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5.2 Epistemic arguments for planning
In Brown’s pragmatic argument, we appealed to measures of the pragmatic
utility of an updating plan. At a given world, we took the pragmatic utility
of an updating plan to be the pragmatic utility at that world of the posterior
it recommends as a response to the evidence you’ll obtain at that world;
and we took the pragmatic utility of a credence function at a world to be the
utility at that world of the option we would choose from a given decision
problem if we were to choose by maximising expected utility from the point
of view of that credence function.
In the epistemic arguments, in contrast, we appeal to measures of the
epistemic utility of an updating plan. At a given world, we take the epis-
temic utility of an updating plan to be the epistemic utility of the posterior it
recommends as a response to the evidence you would obtain at that world;
and we take the epistemic utility of a credence function at a world to be
a measure of how well the posterior does from a purely epistemic point
of view at that world. These measures of epistemic utility might capture
many different epistemic features of the credence function, but they will
often take its epistemic utility at a world to be its gradational accuracy or
proximity to the truth at that world.5 That is, they will often measure how
close the credence function lies to the epistemically ideal credence function
at the world in question; that is, how close it lies to that world’s omniscient
credence function, which assigns maximal credence to all truths and mini-
mal credence to all falsehoods.
We will consider two properties of epistemic utility functions. First,
strict propriety. An epistemic utility function is strictly proper if each prob-
abilistic credence function expects every other credence function to have
lower epistemic utility than it expects itself to have. Second, additivity. An
epistemic utility function is additive if the epistemic utility it assigns to a
credence function is the sum of the epistemic utilities of the individual cre-
dences that the credence function assigns.
Now, the analogue of Brown’s pragmatic argument is Greaves and Wal-
lace’s (2006) epistemic argument. Suppose your measure of epistemic util-
ity is strictly proper. Then Greaves and Wallace show:
(i) any updating plan that is a conditionalizing plan for your prior max-
imises expected epistemic utility from the point of view of your prior;
and
(ii) any updating plan that isn’t a conditionalizing plan for your prior
does not maximise expected epistemic utility from the point of view
of your prior.
5For details of the accuracy-first view of epistemic value for credences, see (Joyce, 1998)
and (Pettigrew, 2016a).
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The analogue of Lewis’ pragmatic argument is Briggs and my (2020)
epistemic argument, which has recently been corrected and improved by
Michael Nielsen (ta). Suppose your measure of epistemic utility is strictly
proper and additive. Then Briggs and I (and Nielsen) show:
(i) if you plan to update other than by conditioning, there is an alterna-
tive prior and updating plan that, taken together, have greater epis-
temic utility in all possible worlds than your prior and updating plan
have, taken together; and
(ii) if you plan to update by conditioning on the evidence, there is no such
alternative.
The problem we face when we try to extend Greaves and Wallace’s as
well as Briggs and my (and Nielsen’s) epistemic arguments to the case of
awareness growth is exactly the same as the problem we face when we try
to extend Brown’s or Lewis’ pragmatic argument. In order to plan how to
respond to awareness growth, you must consider the ways in which your
agenda might expand in the future; but once you’ve considered that, it
should expand in all of those ways right now. What’s more, just as there
is a sure loss argument for the Weak Reflection Principle, so there is an
epistemic argument (Pettigrew, ta). Suppose your measure of epistemic
utility is strictly proper and additive. Then I show:
(i) if your prior is not a mixture of your possible posteriors, then there
is an alternative prior, and, for each possible posterior, an alternative
to that, such that, your prior and any of the possible posteriors, taken
together, have lower epistemic utility than the alternative prior and
the corresponding alternative posterior; and
(ii) if your prior is a mixture of your possible posteriors, there is no such
alternative.
But the concerns I raised about the move to WRP above return here.
So, in the end, I think the arguments for planning to condition on your
evidence tell us little about how we should plan to respond to awareness
growth, or how we should be disposed to respond.
6 Arguments for conditioning on your evidence
6.1 The epistemic argument for conditioning
So we turn now to arguments that try to show not (only) that you should
plan to condition on your evidence, but that you should in fact condition
on it. Here again, the pragmatic and epistemic arguments are very simi-
lar. I’ll begin this time with the epistemic argument, which is due to Dmitri
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Gallow (2019), improving on an original argument by me and Hannes Leit-
geb (Leitgeb & Pettigrew, 2010). As with the epistemic arguments from the
previous section, we begin with an epistemic utility function, which takes a
credence function and a possible world and returns a measure of the epis-
temic value of having that credence function at that world. And, as before,
we assume that it is strictly proper. So every probabilistic credence func-
tion expects itself to do best. Now Gallow thinks that such an epistemic
utility function is appropriate if you care about your epistemic utility at all
of the possible worlds. But, as our evidence increases, it rules out more and
more worlds as possible. And when that happens we should no longer care
about the epistemic value of our credences at those worlds. So, for Gallow,
our epistemic utility function should change as our evidence changes. At
the beginning of our epistemic life, when we have no evidence, it should be
strictly proper. But then later, when we have a particular body of evidence,
it should match our original epistemic utility function for those worlds at
which the evidence is true; but it should take a constant value of 0 at those
worlds at which the evidence is false. By doing that, we encode into our
epistemic utility function the fact that we do not care about the epistemic
value of our credence function at those worlds that our evidence has ruled
out. In symbols: Suppose that, when you have no evidence, your epistemic
utility function is EU—that is, EU(c, w) measures the epistemic value of
having credence function c at world w. Then, if at some future point your
total evidence is given by the proposition E, then your epistemic utility
function should be EUE, which we define as follows:
EUE(c, w) :=
{
EU(c, w) if E is true at w
0 if E is false at w
Then, Gallow shows that the posterior that maximises expected epistemic
value from the point of view of your prior and when your epistemic utility
function is determined by your new evidence in the way just defined is
the one demanded by Bayesian Conditionalization. In symbols: If EU is
strictly proper and c(E) > 0, then c(−|E) maximises expected epistemic
utility from the point of view of c and when your epistemic utility function
is EUE.
6.2 The pragmatic argument for conditioning
The pragmatic argument for conditioning on your evidence is identical, ex-
cept that epistemic utility is replaced by pragmatic utility. As before, we
imagine that you will face a decision at the later time after you adopt your
updated credence function. In Brown’s argument, the pragmatic utility of
an updating plan at a world is the pragmatic utility of the posterior cre-
dence function it recommends at that world, and the pragmatic utility of
a posterior credence function at a world is the utility at that world of the
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option it leads you to choose. In this argument, the pragmatic utility of
a posterior is the same as in Brown’s argument at worlds at which your
evidence is true; but, like in Gallow’s epistemic utility argument, learning
evidence rules out possible worlds and leads you no longer to care about
the utility of the option you choose at those worlds; so you give every cre-
dence function a constant utility of 0 at worlds at which your evidence is
false. In symbols: if ac is the option that maximises expected utility from
the point of view of the credence function c, ac(w) is the utility of that op-




ac(w) if E is true at w
0 if E is false at w
And then we have:
(i) for any decision problem you might face, the posterior obtained by
conditioning your prior on your evidence maximises expected prag-
matic utility from the point of view of your prior; and
(ii) for any posterior other than the one obtained by conditioning your
prior on your evidence, there is a decision problem you might face for
which that posterior does not maximise expected pragmatic utility
from the point of view of your prior.
6.3 Adapting the arguments to the case of awareness growth
Now, how might we adapt these arguments to apply to the case of aware-
ness growth? Let’s take the two types of case, refinement and expansion,
in turn. First, refinement. For instance, let’s recall Mahtani’s example from
above. You begin with credence 12 in each of Landlord and Tenant, credence
1
2 in Bob, and credence 1 in Bob → Tenant. Then you come to realise that
there might be another tenant, so you expand your agenda to include Other
and Other→ Tenant. How should you now set your credences in the orig-
inal four propositions as well as these two new ones? Gallow’s argument
suggests you should maximise expected epistemic utility from the point
of view of your prior. But how should we define that expectation? In
order to define an expectation, we need a set of possibilities. These pos-
sibilities should be pairwise exclusive and collectively exhaustive, so that
there is no way in which two of them might both be true, and no way in
which all of them might be false; we should assign credences to each; and
those credences should sum to 1. Given this, it seems our possibilities must
be Landlord and Tenant, since Landlord, Bob, and Tenant are not exclusive,
and precisely what our awareness growth has taught us is that Landlord
and Bob are not exhaustive. Now, suppose we try to calculate the expected
epistemic utility of different possible posteriors over our expanded agenda
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using that set of possibilities. Then we hit a roadblock. The problem is
that, in order to determine the epistemic value of a credence function that
assigns credences to Bob and Other, a possibility must determine the truth
value of those two propositions; but, while Landlord determines that they
are both false, Tenant does not determine which of them is true. So it seems
that, at best, we might use these possibilities to define the expected epis-
temic utility of a credence function defined only on Landlord and Tenant,
and not to define the expected utility of a credence function defined on the
full new agenda. But even this restricted application gives some substantial
results. After all, since I don’t learn any new evidence between the earlier
and the later time, my epistemic utility function will stay the same. And
so my prior credences in Landlord and Tenant will expect themselves to be
best. So Gallow’s argument seems to suggest that I should assign the same
credences to Landlord and Tenant before and after I’ve come to realise that
there is another way in which Tenant might be true. But of course this is
precisely what I suggested above is not required. Realising that there is a
third possible singer in the shower, I might naturally divide my credences
equally over the three possibilities, thereby making Tenant twice as likely
as Landlord. So Gallow’s argument seems to prove too much. Below, we’ll
see why that might be.
Let’s consider expansion next. In this case, we hit a roadblock much
sooner. The problem is that, in cases of expansion, there is no set of possi-
bilities that we can use to define the expected epistemic utility of the pos-
terior credence functions, even when we restrict those posteriors to smaller
agendas. After all, what is distinctive about cases of expansion is that you
learn that the possibilities that you considered before were not exhaustive:
in cases of expansion, you expand the set of possibilities considered in your
agenda, filling in part of logical space that you hadn’t previously consid-
ered.
So it seems at first sight that, in cases of refinement, Gallow’s argument
says that we should retain our credences in any set of exclusive and exhaus-
tive possibilities to which we assign credences that sum to unity; whereas
in cases of expansion, it is silent and supports no norm. In fact, I think
things are a bit more complicated. To see why, let’s think about a natu-
ral objection to Gallow’s argument for updating by conditioning on your
evidence.
6.4 Doxastic crises and the normative authority of your prior
You might think: I start with a prior credence function; then I learn some
new evidence; but by learning that evidence, I realise that my prior is
flawed because it doesn’t take that evidence into account; therefore, my
prior has no normative authority at the later time after I’ve learned the evi-
dence, and so its expectations have no normative authority at that time, and
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so I can’t be required to pick the posterior at that time that would maximise
expected epistemic value from the point of view of my prior.
I think this is a poor objection. To see why, ask this: What is it about
learning the evidence that makes me realise that my prior is flawed? Well,
you might think that, when I learn the proposition I do, and I see that my
prior does not assign it maximal credence, I see that my prior is flawed.
But why think that, just because I’ve learned a proposition, I must assign
it maximal credence? What is the justification of that norm? Gallow’s ar-
gument provides an answer to both of these questions. It says that, when
you learn the new proposition, you adopt a new epistemic utility function,
namely, the one that measures epistemic utility the same way that your
old one does for worlds at which the proposition is true, but gives a con-
stant epistemic utility of 0 at worlds at which it is false. And then you note
that your prior does not maximise expected epistemic utility from its own
point of view when epistemic utility is measured in this new way. And,
what’s more, it recommends a replacement. It says: I was the right way to
go when you valued epistemic utility the way you used to; but now you
no longer care about your epistemic utility at certain worlds because your
new evidence rules them out, and now I think you should adopt this other
credence function instead. Indeed, as Gallow shows, it says you should
adopt the credence function obtained from your prior by conditioning on
your new evidence. So Gallow’s argument tells us why I should think my
prior is flawed after I learn the evidence. But it does so on the assump-
tion that my prior retains its normative authority while it is being used to
assess possible posteriors using my new epistemic utility function. So the
objection fails because it relies on an assumption—namely, when I learn
new evidence, I realise my prior is flawed—that itself is best justified by
assuming something that the objection denies—namely, when I first learn
the evidence and change my epistemic utility function, my prior retains its
normative authority to assess the possible posteriors and pick out the one I
should adopt.
Nonetheless, the objection raises an important point. In order for Gal-
low’s argument to work, your prior has got to retain its normative authority
at the later time after you learn the evidence. I think it’s wrong to say, as the
objection says, that learning new evidence always immediately deprives
your prior of its normative authority, but that’s not to say that nothing can.
In Section 2, we saw that the problem of awareness growth only really
arises for a permissivist. So let’s suppose permissivism is true. Then, at
least for some individuals and some bodies of evidence, the evidence alone
does not pick out a unique credence function that rationality requires us to
have in response. Let’s suppose that I am such an individual with such a
body of evidence; and let’s suppose I have a particular rational prior in re-
sponse. So there are other possible priors I might have adopted that would
have been rational responses to that evidence. What gives this particular
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prior normative authority for me? It cannot be that it has any advantage
over the other rational ones from the point of view of rationality.6 Rather, it
must be simply that this is my prior; it is the prior I picked from the range of
possible rational priors. Why does this bestow normative authority on it?
Well, because I inhabit these credences; I see the world through them; they
record what I think about how the world is. And, so long as they do so, I’m
rationally required to use them to make decisions. But I am not rationally
required to continue to inhabit them in this way. Things can happen to
me that shake me out of these beliefs, things that make me stop inhabiting
them; things that make me stand outside them and reconsider them from
an external vantage point. Sometimes, this happens because of unexpected
shocks to the system. For instance, crises of mental health, grief, or political
and societal cataclysms can lead us to stand outside the view of the world
that we have been inhabiting hitherto, and look down on our beliefs and
sometimes abandon them. Less dramatically, the same can happen when
we reflect on ways in which those beliefs were formed in the first place.
For instance, we might realise that there is a certain arbitrariness to the cre-
dences we adopted at the beginning of our epistemic life and with which
we began our epistemic journey. And indeed, in a similar spirit, the same
can happen when we reflect on the truth of permissivism itself, if indeed
we take it to be a truth. Reflecting on the fact that there are other ratio-
nally permissible responses to our evidence might lead us to stand outside
our current beliefs and ask whether we wish to retain them. So the norma-
tive authority of our prior is conditional on us continuing to inhabit it; but
there is no norm that prevents us from no longer inhabiting the credences
we have and instead picking others that are also rational.7
Now, it seems to me that awareness growth might well precipitate the
sort of crisis in belief that leads you to abandon your prior and thus deprive
it of its normative authority. After all, the way you set your priors might
well have been heavily influenced by the possibilities of which you were
aware at the time you set them. Becoming aware of new ones might well
make you stand outside the credences at which you’ve now arrived and
decide no longer to follow their lead. And, when it does this, the tweaked
version of Gallow’s argument will have no force, even in the refinement
case. Think of the case of the singing in Bob’s bathroom. When you come
to realise that there might be another tenant in the flat, this could well shake
6Indeed, if we follow Elizabeth Jackson’s (2019) sufficientarian approach and think that
permissivism is true not because there are many responses to our evidence that are maxi-
mally and equally good, but because, while there might be a best response, all responses
above a certain level of epistemic goodness are good enough and thereby rational, it could
be that my rationally permissible prior is in fact worse than many of the alternative ratio-
nally permissible ones.
7See (Titelbaum, 2016) for further discussion of cases in which we change our mind
without the catalyst of evidence or awareness growth.
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you out of your current credences, because it makes you think that, when
you set them initially, you were working with a flawed or incomplete con-
ception of the space of possibilities. If this realisation does shake you out
of your current credences, then they lose their normative authority, and the
fact that you maximise expected epistemic utility from their point of view
by retaining your prior credences in Landlord and Tenant does not entail that
you should do that.
I think something similar happens when we are introduced to a scepti-
cal hypothesis, whether it is Descartes’ malicious demon hypothesis, or the
automaton hypothesis that is intended to induce scepticism about the ex-
istence of other minds, or Russell’s hypothesis that the world was created
only five minutes ago, complete with us and all our apparent memories of
times before that. Having never considered the possibility that the external
world is an illusion, or that other human bodies do not house minds, or
that the world is of an extremely recent vintage and our memories beyond
a certain point are not real, I react to becoming aware of it by no longer tak-
ing my prior to have normative authority. When Stanley Cavell (1979) talks
of the vertigo or terror or anxiety that is induced by your first introduction
to a sceptical hypothesis, I think this is partly what he means. The beliefs
we have inhabited and which encode our view of the world are called into
question wholesale and their normative authority evaporates. Here is Dun-
can Pritchard (2021, 8) describing a similar phenomenon in his discussion
of Cavell:
The metaphor [of vertigo] is apt, for it seems that this anxiety
[that Cavell describes] is specifically arising as a result of a kind
of philosophical ‘ascent’ to a perspective overlooking our prac-
tices, and hence to that extent disengaged from them (as op-
posed to the ordinary pre-philosophical perspective in which
one is unself-consciously embedded within those practices).
In our case, the practices are the prior credences; inhabiting those credences
is being unself-consciously embedded within them. Awareness growth can
often occasion exactly this sort of philosophical ‘ascent’ to a perspective at
which those priors no longer have normative authority.
One other thing that can shake us out of our beliefs is the realisation
that they possess a rational flaw. To illustrate how this might happen in
expansion cases, let’s recast Mahtani’s example as such a case. That is, at
the earlier time, you have credences only in Landlord and Bob. You do not
consider the propositions Tenant or Bob → Tenant. And you assign equal
credence of 12 to these two possibilities. As a result, when you come to re-
alise that there might be someone in the house other than Bob or his land-
lord, you do not refine the possibility Tenant, since you do not consider that
proposition, but rather you add a new possibility you hadn’t considered
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before, namely, Other. Now, there are (at least) two sorts of betting argu-
ment that I can make if I wish to show that your credences are irrational.
The most common, as well as the most compelling, is this: we show that
your credences will lead you to accept a series of bets that, taken together,
will lose you money however the world turns out—that is, they lead you to
a sure loss. The less common, and slightly less compelling, is this: we show
that your credences will lead you to accept a series of bets that, taken to-
gether, will gain you no money however the world turns out, and will lose
you money given some ways the world might turn out—that is, they lead
you to a possible loss with no possible gain. Now, relative to the original
set of possibilities—Landlord and Bob—your credences of 12 in each are not
vulnerable to a sure loss, and they are not vulnerable to a possible loss with
no possible gain. However, relative to the new set of possibilities after the
expansion—Landlord, Bob, and Other—your credences are still not vulnera-
ble to a sure loss, but they are vulnerable to a possible loss with no possible
gain. That is, they are vulnerable to the less common sort of betting argu-
ment. After all, they will lead you to pay £5 for a bet that pays out £10 if
Landlord is true and £0 if it is false; and they will lead you to pay £5 for a bet
that pays out £10 if Bob is true and £0 if it is false.8 Now, if Landlord is true,
these bets, taken together, will cancel out and make you no money, but they
will also lose you no money; and similarly if Bob is true. But if Other is true,
then they will lose you £10. And this will be true whenever you divide your
credences entirely over a set of possibilities that is not exhaustive.9 When
you come to realise that the set of possibilities is not exhaustive, you realise
that your credences make you vulnerable to such bets, and that should be
a catalyst for replacing them.
So there is a number of ways in which awareness growth can precipitate
a doxastic crisis that robs your priors of their normative authority. Now,
it is also true that new evidence might provoke such a crisis and such a
loss of normative authority. And so Gallow’s argument does not establish
that we should never update other than by conditioning our prior on our
new evidence; only that we should do that when our priors retain their
normative authority after the evidence comes in. Sometimes, if gaining the
new evidence leads to a doxastic crisis, we might abandon our prior, pick
another that we take to have normative authority, and condition that on our
total evidence, knowing that doing so will maximise expected epistemic
utility from the point of view of the new prior we’ve picked. But this will be
much rarer than in the case of awareness growth. And the reason is related
to the points I made above about why we cannot hope for a pragmatic or
8Here, we make the usual assumptions of such arguments, namely, that, for any number
S, a credence of p in proposition X will lead you to pay £pS for a bet that pays out £S if X is
true and £0 if X is false. Or, to be more careful, replace pounds with units of utility.
9This argument is due originally to Abner Shimony (1955). For an introductory presen-
tation, see (Pettigrew, 2020, 2.7, 3.6).
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epistemic argument for planning to update in a particular way in response
to awareness growth. We tend not to suffer a doxastic crisis when we learn
new evidence because we have typically considered the possibility that we
will obtain that specific new evidence in advance of actually obtaining it.
On the other hand, while we might consider in the abstract the possibility
that we will become aware of further possibilities in the future, we cannot
consider specific possibilities of which we might become aware, since by
considering them we become aware of them. New possibilities, therefore,
take us by surprise and thereby lead us to abandon our priors much more
often than new evidence.
7 Responding to a doxastic crisis
In the previous section, we saw how a doxastic crisis might rob your prior
of its normative authority. When it does, I argued, you are free to pick a
new prior and then bring it up to date it by maximising your expected epis-
temic utility from its point of view, where your epistemic utility is defined
using your current evidence in the way that Gallow suggests—that is, you
pick a new prior and condition it on your current evidence. Are there any
constraints on the new prior you should pick? Of course, you must pick a
rational one, and which boast that property will depend on your favoured
brand of permissivism. But are there constraints beyond that?
Here is one view on which there is. According to a view I’ve devel-
oped elsewhere, the priors you should pick at the beginning of your epis-
temic life should be determined partly or wholly by considerations of epis-
temic risk (Pettigrew, 2016b,c, 2022). The idea is this: according to epis-
temic utility theory, what it is epistemically rational to believe is what you
would choose to believe, if you were able to choose what to believe, and
if, when choosing, you were moved entirely by considerations of the epis-
temic value of your beliefs. That is, we do not assume that we are able
to choose our beliefs; rather, we assess their rationality by assessing what
it would be rational to choose were we able to, and were we to care only
about epistemic value when we made the choice. This is the account of
epistemic rationality behind Gallow’s argument for updating by condition-
ing on your evidence. But it might also tell us which priors are rational for
an individual. In Gallow’s argument, when you have to choose your poste-
riors, you use your priors to calculate the expected epistemic utility of the
different possible options. When you’re picking your prior, you don’t have
such a prior available. So you need a decision rule that, unlike maximis-
ing expected utility, does not require probabilities as one of its ingredients.
Now, there are plenty of these around, and many of them determine what
it is rational to choose by appealing to your attitudes to risk. For instance,
Abraham Wald’s (1945) Minimax decision rule is suited to the maximally
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risk-averse: it tells you to choose an option whose worst case outcome is
best; that is, you rank the options by the utility each achieves at the worlds
where it achieves its lowest utility, and you pick one at the top of the rank-
ing. And, in previous work, I showed that, if you apply this rule when you
pick your prior, and if your measure of epistemic utility is strictly proper
in the sense defined above, then you should pick the uniform distribution
over the set of possible worlds of which you are aware—that is, if there
are n such worlds, each should receive a credence of 1n (Pettigrew, 2016b).
Another example: noting that Wald’s Minimax principle is too severely
risk averse, Leonid Hurwicz (1951, 1952) proposed his Criterion of Real-
ism, which generalises Wald’s rule: it does not demand that you consider
only the worst case outcomes of an option, but rather asks that you set a
weight for best cases and a weight for worst cases, rank the options by
the weighted sum of their best- and worst-case utilities, and pick an op-
tion from the top of the ranking. This decision rule accommodates both the
more risk averse, who will give greater weight to the worst case, as well
as the more risk-inclined, who will give greater weight to the best case—
and Wald’s rule is the special case in which you give all of your weight to
the worst case. And I have shown that, when we use this rule to pick our
priors, it gives different recommendations depending on the weight you
give to the best case (Pettigrew, 2016c). Suppose λ is the weight you give
to the best case, and 1− λ the weight you give to the worst; and suppose n
is the number of possible worlds of which you are aware. Then, if λ ≤ 1n ,
then Hurwicz’s Criterion agrees with Minimax: you should pick the uni-
form distribution over the worlds, which assigns 1n to each. But, if
1
n < λ,
then you should do something different: first, pick a world; second, assign
credence λ to that world; third, then divide the remaining credence equally
among the remaining worlds, giving 1−λn−1 to each.
Now, just as we might use Minimax or Hurwicz’s Criterion at the be-
ginning of our epistemic lives, when we pick our initial credences, so we
might use it after a doxastic crisis, when our previous credence function no
longer has normative authority over our choice of posterior. And it seems
that the sort of event that leads us to abandon the normative authority of
our prior is unlikely to lead us to abandon our attitudes to epistemic risk.
If that’s so, then those attitudes to epistemic risk might continue to place
constraints on the new credence function we pick after our doxastic crisis
to replace our abandoned prior, just as they placed constraints on our initial
choice of credence function.
Let’s briefly sketch an example. I begin with credences over just two
possibilities: Red, which says that my friend’s brooch is red, and Not Red,
which says it isn’t. And perhaps I am maximally risk averse, and so adhere
to Wald’s Minimax. Then I should assign credence 12 to each possibility.
But now suppose that, without gaining any new evidence, I become aware
of two fine-grainings of the possibility Not Red: they are Blue and Yellow.
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This leads me to abandon the normative authority of my prior, but not
my commitment to extreme risk aversion in the epistemic sphere. So now
Minimax tells me to assign credence 13 to Red,
1
3 to Blue, and
1
3 to Yellow. And
of course, as we noted above, that leads me to violate Reverse Bayesianism,
since my initial credence in Red is the same as my initial credence in Not Red,
while my new credence in Red is half my new credence in Not Red.
Another example, briefly. Again, I am initially aware only of Red and
Not Red. But I am not so risk averse as to use Minimax. Perhaps instead I
assign a weight of λ = 512 to the best case and 1− λ =
7
12 to the worst case.
Then, since 512 <
1
2 , Hurwicz’s criterion says that I should assign credence
1
2 to each possibility. But now suppose again that, without gaining any
new evidence, I become aware of two fine-grainings of Not Red, namely,
Blue and Yellow. Then, since 13 <
5
12 , Hurwicz’s criterion tells me to pick a
possibility, assign credence 512 to that possibility, and divide the remaining
credence equally between the other two. So I might assign 512 to Blue, for
instance, and 724 to Red and
7
24 to Yellow.
8 Accuracy and flipflopping
Before we wrap up, let me consider an objection to the picture of rational
credence I’ve been painting here. According to that account, diachronic
norms, such as the requirement to update by conditioning on your evi-
dence, or any requirement to respond to awareness growth in a particular
way, is conditional on your prior retaining its normative authority at the
later time. And there is no rational requirement to continue to take it to
have that normative authority. Many different sorts of event can lead you
to stand outside your beliefs and reassess them. Now, suppose there are
two credence functions that are rational responses to my current evidence.
I have the first at an earlier time. Then, at a later time, having learned
nothing new and having not experienced any awareness growth, I come
to abandon the normative authority of that first credence function, and I
adopt the second one to replace it.10 According to the picture I’ve been
sketching, there is no irrationality here. And yet the following is true: sup-
pose you measure epistemic value using a strictly proper scoring rule of
the sort described above. Then there is a third credence function such that,
however the world turns out, the total epistemic utility of having this third
credence function at both the earlier and the later time is greater than the
total epistemic utility of having the first credence function at the earlier
time and the second credence function at the later time. For instance, sup-
pose I assign a credence only to the proposition Rain, which says it will
10In the literature on permissivism, this is sometimes known as ‘flip-flopping’ (Meacham,
2014).
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rain tomorrow. Suppose that, at the earlier time, I assign credence p to that
proposition; and then, at the later time and after receiving no new evidence,
I assign credence q to it instead. Then, for any strictly proper epistemic
utility functions, there is a credence r that lies between p and q such that I
would have been better off assigning credence r to Rain at both times. Had
I done this, the sum of my epistemic utilities at the earlier and later times
would be greater regardless of how the world turns out, that is, regardless
of whether it does or does not rain tomorrow. Surely it follows from this
that it is irrational to change your credences between an earlier and a later
time? After all, if you do, there is an epistemic life you might have led that
is guaranteed to be better than the one you do lead.
I think not. It is true that, if I were in a position to pick my entire epis-
temic life at the outset, it would be irrational for me to pick the one in
which I change credences—where my credence in Rain changes from p to q
without any new evidence—since there’s an alternative that’s guaranteed
to be better—namely, where I assign credence r at both times. But, hav-
ing picked credence p at the earlier time, and now sitting at the later time
standing outside my belief and asking which credence I should assign at
that time, this consideration is irrelevant. After all, I can no longer choose
to assign r at both times. I can choose to stick with p, or I can change and
adopt q. But sticking with p isn’t guaranteed to be better than changing.
For epistemic utility functions that measure the accuracy of credences, as-
signing p at both times will be better if it doesn’t rain tomorrow, since p is
more accurate than q in that situation; but it will be worse if it does rain. So
the fact that it would have been better for sure to have r at both times does
not tell us that, having chosen p at the earlier time, it’s irrational to change
to q at the later time.
9 Conclusion
Arguments for diachronic credal norms come in three varieties. The first,
exemplified by Lewis’ sure loss argument and Briggs and Pettigrew’s (and
Nielsen’s) epistemic utility argument, take an individual’s prior credences
and their plans for their posterior credences together, and ask from an im-
partial standpoint whether there is a problem with having both. The prob-
lem we face if we try to extend this to the case of awareness growth is that
it isn’t clear how we can plan to update in the face of future growth in our
agenda without expanding our agenda in that the time we do the planning,
which makes the planning futile. The second sort of argument, exemplified
by Brown’s pragmatic argument and Greaves and Wallace’s epistemic ar-
gument, takes the priors and the plans for the posteriors and asks the priors
to evaluate the plans for the posteriors. This faces the same problem. The
third sort of argument, exemplified by Gallow’s epistemic argument and
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the pragmatic version I described above, does not involve plans. Rather,
it takes the prior to evaluate posteriors using an epistemic utility function
that is determined partly by the individual’s evidence. Extending this ar-
gument to the case of pure awareness growth, where there is change in
agenda but no simultaneous change in evidence, we get an argument for
a very strong conclusion in the case of refinement, where it says that you
should retain your credences in the propositions in any partition to which
you originally assigned credences; but, in the case of expansion, it supports
no norm because there is no partition to which you assigned credences at
the earlier time, and therefore no way to calculate expected epistemic or
pragmatic utility.
However, I argued that, even in those cases in which this sort of ar-
gument applies and seems to establish a norm that governs awareness
growth, it only does so conditionally; it only establishes that norm if your
prior retains normative authority for you, which happens only if you con-
tinue to inhabit the view of the world that it encodes. I noted that this is also
true in ordinary cases in which you learn new evidence but do not change
your agenda. But I pointed out that new evidence much less often leads
us to stand outside our beliefs and reassess them than awareness growth
does. So any such norms that follow in the case of awareness growth will
apply much less often than those that follow in the case of new evidence.
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Brown, P. M. (1976). Conditionalization and expected utility. Philosophy of
Science, 43(3), 415–419.
Canson, C. (ms). The Nature of Awareness Growth. Unpublished
manuscript.
Cavell, S. (1979). The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and
Tragedy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Gallow, J. D. (2019). Learning and Value Change. Philosophers’ Imprint, 19,
1–22.
27
Greaves, H., & Wallace, D. (2006). Justifying Conditionalization: Condi-
tionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility. Mind, 115(459), 607–
632.
Hurwicz, L. (1951). A Class of Criteria for Decision-Making Under Igno-
rance. Tech. Rep. Statistics 356, Cowles Commission Discussion Paper.
Hurwicz, L. (1952). A criterion for decision making under uncertainty.
Tech. Rep. Technical Report 355, Cowles Commission.
Jackson, E. (2019). A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism. Epis-
teme, (pp. 1–15).
Jaynes, E. T. (2003). Probability Theory: The Logic of Science.. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Jeffrey, R. (1965). The Logic of Decision. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Joyce, J. M. (1998). A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism. Philosophy
of Science, 65(4), 575–603.
Karni, E., & Vierø, M.-L. (2013). “Reverse Bayesianism”: A Choice-Based
Theory of Growing Awareness. American Economic Review, 103(7), 2790–
2810.
Leitgeb, H., & Pettigrew, R. (2010). An Objective Justification of Bayesian-
ism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy. Philosophy of Science,
77, 236–272.
Lewis, D. (1980). A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance. In R. C. Jeffrey
(Ed.) Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, vol. II. Berkeley: University
of California Press.
Lewis, D. (1999). Why Conditionalize? In Papers in Metaphysics and Episte-
mology, (pp. 403–407). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Mahtani, A. (ta). Awareness growth and dispositional attitudes. Synthese.
Meacham, C. J. G. (2014). Impermissive Bayesianism. Erkenntnis, 79, 1185–
1217.
Nielsen, M. (ta). Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization. Philosophical
Studies, (pp. 1–20).
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